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The current study examines how like-minded media consumption and inter-party hostility 
contribute to the formation of political stereotypes. More specifically, I investigated stereotypes 
about Democrats’ and Republicans’ general willingness to accept inequality among social 
groups. Prior research indicates that political stereotypes tend to be exaggerations of actual 
liberal-conservative differences in personality. However, researchers know little about the factors 
contributing to Democrats’ and Republicans’ expression of exaggerated partisan stereotypes. I 
hypothesized that like-minded media consumption, inter-party hostility, and Democratic Party 
affiliation would be positive predictors of stereotype exaggeration. To test this hypothesis, 259 
U.S. partisan adults completed the Social Dominance Orientation Scale. Using an instructional 
manipulation they took the scale three times: As themselves, as if they were the average 
Democrat, and as if they were the average Republican. Then participants completed measures of 
media consumption, inter-party hostility, and party affiliation. The data indicated that Democrats 
exhibited higher levels of stereotype exaggeration when compared to Republicans. Also, like-
minded media consumption and inter-party hostility were positive predictors of stereotype 
exaggeration. Exploratory analyses indicated that like-minded media consumption predicted 
stereotype exaggeration which, in turn, was associated with lower expectations for public 
deliberation. I interpret the results by drawing on social identity theory and research in media 
studies. 
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     1Party affiliation and political ideology are closely related constructs. For this reason the 





From 1994 to 2014 the number of partisans who strongly dislike their political rivals has 
doubled (Pew Research Center, 2014b). When I use the word ‘partisans’ I am referring to 
Democrats and Republicans, 20 percent of whom feel very cold  towards their political rivals 
(Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). In this highly polarized climate, partisans may insulate themselves 
from their political rivals by consuming media that agrees with their own stance. Like-minded 
media consumption is problematic because when people do not expose themselves to diverse 
viewpoints they become more intolerant (Cappella, Price, & Nir, 2002; Mutz, 2006). Ideological 
intolerance might manifest as hostile partisan stereotypes that would further reduce the quality of 
public deliberation amongst Democrats and Republicans. Mitigation of this conflict will require 
knowledge of why it is happening. One contributing factor described by leading political 
psychologist John Jost and colleagues is the psychological differences between liberals and 
conservatives (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Scherer, Windschitl, & Graham, 
2015).1 
Within the motivated social cognition framework developed by Jost, liberals and 
conservatives differ in their level of traits falling into one of three categories: Epistemic, 
existential, and ideological (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009 for review). Epistemic traits refer 
to a person’s tendencies for reducing feelings of uncertainty whereas existential traits concern 
how a person finds meaning in their lives. Ideological traits describe a person’s willingness to 
accept inequality and resist change. Jost and colleagues argue there is an affinity between the 
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ideological, existential, and epistemic traits and the core tenets of conservatism. For example, 
social dominance orientation, an ideological trait traditionally associated with conservatives, 
describes a person’s general willingness to accept inequality among social groups (Ho et al., 
2012; Ho et al., 2015; Jost et al., 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). People’s 
social dominance orientation may incline them to identify as conservative. In doing so, the 
policies they endorse are made consistent with their personality in a way that is satisfying.  
Liberal-conservative differences in personality are not all that matter when explaining 
political polarization. Researchers also should take into account the social stereotypes people 
develop about these differences (Scherer et al., 2015). Social stereotypes, a more specific form of 
which are political stereotypes, refer to generalizations about groups of people (Allport, 1954). 
Social stereotypes are not to be confused with the related concept of prejudice which concerns 
stereotypes based on antipathy and inflexible generalizations. Stereotypes have a deep 
evolutionary history and are known to play a role in the conflict between groups, like that 
between Democrats and Republicans (Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010). The differences 
people perceive there to be between Democrats and Republicans can fuel conflict between these 
groups. 
A growing body of research on political stereotypes investigates people’s beliefs about 
the qualities of Democrats and Republicans (e.g. Chambers, Baron, & Inman, 2006; Chambers & 
Melnyk, 2006; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Judd & Park, 1993; Scherer et al., 2015). This 
research contributes to an understanding of partisan conflict. However, political psychologists 
lack insight into how social environments serve to reinforce partisan stereotypes (see Graham et 
al., 2012 for discussion). For example, they have not investigated the role of media usage in 
stereotype endorsement, which is surprising, given that media portrayals influence cultural 
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stereotypes (e.g. Murphy, 1998). The current study examines the role of party affiliation and 
media consumption in predicting stereotype endorsement to expand the field’s knowledge of the 
factors associated with partisan stereotypes. 
Political stereotypes vary in their degree of accuracy (Judd & Park, 1993), which may be 
surprising, given that people often assume stereotypes are inherently inaccurate (Jussim, 
Crawford, & Rubenstein, 2015). The idea that stereotypes are fundamentally inaccurate has a 
long history in social psychology. Indeed, Katz and Braly (1935) claimed that stereotypes are, 
“Fixed impressions which conform very little to the facts [they] pretend to represent (p. 267).” 
Despite the widespread belief that stereotypes are inaccurate, there is little empirical support for 
such claims (Jussim et al., 2015). In fact, Jussim and colleagues (2016) conducted a meta-
analysis and concluded that not only is stereotype accuracy one of the most replicable effects in 
social psychology, it is also one of the largest.  
Political stereotypes, in particular, have some accuracy in that the direction of liberal-
conservative differences are correct (Scherer et al., 2015). For instance, partisans perceive 
Republicans as having higher levels of social dominance orientation (SDO) than Democrats, and 
Republicans actually do have higher levels of this trait. Partisans understand liberal-conservative 
differences in personality giving their political stereotypes a degree of accuracy. Yet political 
stereotypes are not fully accurate because of the tendency to overestimate the magnitude of 
liberal-conservative differences in personality (Graham et al., 2012; Scherer et al., 2015). For 
example, consider the extent to which partisans differ in their SDO. This actual difference is 
smaller than the degree to which people perceive partisans as different in this trait. As a result, 
political stereotypes may tend to be caricature-like exaggerations helping party members set 
themselves apart from their political rivals. 
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One account of political stereotypes comes from social identity theorists, who posit that 
people differentiate their in-groups from their out-groups in a manner that positively reflects 
upon themselves (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, Republicans might frame Democrats’ 
pro-choice position as one condoning murder to make their own pro-life stance seem more 
reasonable by comparison. Greene (1999) was one of the first to apply social identity theory to 
party affiliation in the United States. He found a positive association between strength of party 
affiliation and the tendency for people to view their stance on policy issues as different from 
their political rivals. For instance, the more strongly someone identified as a Democrat, the more 
they tended to view their stance on abortion as different from Republicans. Later research built 
upon this idea by suggesting that Democrats and Republicans misrepresent their political rivals 
to depict themselves, and the group they associate with, in a more positive light (see Chambers & 
Melnyk, 2006 for discussion). Beyond making one's self and party look good, partisans might 
misrepresent their rivals because it is socially acceptable. 
In politics, it is often socially acceptable to voice exaggerated stereotypes. However, 
when it comes to other topics such as race, people’s stereotypes tend to underestimate group 
traits because it is socially desirable to appear unprejudiced (McCauley, 1995; McCauley & Stit, 
1978). The same desire to appear unprejudiced does not apply to politics. Democrats and 
Republicans are sometimes open about expressing mild forms of prejudice such as intentionally 
avoiding contact with each other (Allport, 1954; Lelkes & Westwood, 2017). In fact, partisans 
may feel social pressure to overstate their negative feelings about out-party members (Lelkes, 
2016). These negative feelings might manifest as hostile partisan stereotypes that reduce 
citizens’ expectations for public deliberation of civic or political issues. One possibility is that 
when Democrats and Republicans endorse exaggerated partisan stereotypes they develop lower 
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expectations for public deliberation. That is, partisans may be less apt to productively engage 
with one another if they have misunderstandings about their political rivals’ character and 
exaggerate the extent of their differences.  
Liberals and conservatives have stereotypes about the moral character of one another 
(Graham et al., 2012). For instance, across the ideological spectrum people perceive 
conservatives as placing less emphasis on fairness and egalitarianism than liberals. People are 
getting the direction of liberal-conservative differences correct in that conservatives actually do 
tend to be less concerned about fairness and egalitarianism. However, the stereotypes are 
inaccurate in that people tend to overestimate the magnitude of moral differences between 
liberals and conservatives. Moreover, liberals, when compared to conservatives, tend to hold less 
accurate political stereotypes about the moral characteristics of people across the ideological 
spectrum (Graham et al., 2012). For example, liberals significantly underestimate the typical 
conservative’s concern for mitigating harm and encouraging fair outcomes. Researchers have 
replicated this general finding for closely related traits such as SDO found in the motivated 
social cognition framework (Scherer et al., 2015).  
Scherer and colleagues (2015) investigated political stereotypes about epistemic, 
existential, and ideological traits. Recall that the ideological traits, one of which is SDO, 
concerns people’s acceptance of inequality. They sampled 219 participants whose political 
affiliations were largely representative of the U.S. population. Participants took an older version 
of the SDO Scale (Pratto et al., 1994) three times by adopting the perspective of the average 
Democrat, the average Republican, and themselves. They found participants who affiliated with 
both parties tended to exaggerate Republicans’ level of SDO. For our purposes, there are two 
takeaways from this study. First, stereotype exaggeration was greatest for SDO when compared 
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to the other traits the authors examined. Second, and contrary to the authors’ hypotheses, 
affiliation with the Democratic Party tended to be associated with higher levels of stereotype 
exaggeration. These findings suggest that Democrats stereotype Republicans as being more 
domineering and anti-egalitarian than they actually are. 
In sum, people misunderstand the character of Democrats and Republicans. They tend to 
view Democrats and Republicans as more different than they actually are, a phenomena called 
stereotype exaggeration. While researchers have evidence that stereotype exaggeration occurs, 
there remain open questions about its origin.  What role has the modern media environment 
played in people’s endorsement of partisan stereotypes? Are reports of stereotype exaggeration 
expressions of inter-party hostility?  
Media and Inter-Party Hostility as Contributors to Political Stereotypes 
Like-minded media consumption occurs when people consume media coming from a 
source agreeing with their political views. For example, liberals and conservatives may rely on 
MSNBC and FOX respectively as their primary or sole source of political news (Pew Research 
Center, 2014a). Garrett and Stroud (2014) review three psychological explanations for why 
people consume like-minded media, all of which may have some validity. First, cognitive 
dissonance theory suggests that by consuming like-minded media people can avoid the 
psychological discomfort that often results from exposure to contradictory views (Festinger, 
1962). Second, Ziemke (1980) argues that it is easier to process like-minded media. He theorizes 
that if people are cognitive misers, then it is only natural for them to select sources that are 
simpler to process. Third, empirical research indicates that people tend to view like-minded 
media as higher quality (Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2008). Thus, it would seem only natural 
for people to choose the perceived quality and comfort of like-minded media, especially given 
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the abundance of choice in the modern media environment.  
Researchers disagree regarding the extent to which the modern media environment is 
conducive to like-minded media consumption. Iyengar and Hahn (2009) argue that the internet 
encourages like-minded media consumption by allowing people to self-select into niche online 
communities. There are a couple of caveats however, especially in regards to social media. First, 
social media usage can increase people’s exposure to counter-attitudinal sources (Messing & 
Westwood, 2014). On major social media platforms people receive suggestions for content based 
on popularity. These suggestions often include ideologically diverse sources that people may not 
have otherwise encountered. Second, researchers demonstrated that not all of social media is an 
echo chamber because it depends on the type of issue people are discussing (Barbera, Jost, 
Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015). They found that Twitter acts as an echo chamber for political 
issues more so than non-political issues. For instance, people are less inclined to engage in like-
minded media consumption when discussing the Super Bowl as opposed to midterm elections. 
The point is that social media is not inherently an echo chamber. However, like-minded media 
consumption does happen on these platforms, and especially for political issues.  
Iyengar and Hahn (2009) raise concerns over the consequences of like-minded media 
consumption. In particular, they suggest that like-minded media consumption may detract from 
the quality of public discourse by insulating people from competing ideas and promoting inter-
party hostility. A body of empirical research provides support for this argument. Like-minded 
media consumption is linked to reduced tolerance for competing views (Cappella, Price, & Nir, 
2002; Mutz, 2006), increased support for one’s own party (Arceneaux, Johnson, & Cryderman, 
2013; Levendusky, 2013; Stroud, 2010; Wojcieszak, Bimber, Feldman, & Stroud, 2015), and 
more negative stereotypes about out-party members (Garrett et al., 2014). Furthermore, like-
 
    
8 
 
minded media consumption is associated with greater feelings of anger towards one’s political 
rivals (Hasell & Weeks, 2016). These findings suggest that like-minded media consumption can 
lead people to feel more hostile towards their political rivals.  
Affective polarization refers to the increasing level of mutual hostility between 
Democrats and Republicans (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012). Political scientists note that 
affective polarization has risen for 50 years and explain this trend using social identity theory 
(Iyengar et al., 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Partisans identify with their political party, and in 
doing so, develop emotional attachments to it (Greene, 1999). Increasingly the emotional warmth 
that partisans feel towards their in-party is accompanied by coldness towards their out-party 
(Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). Out-party hostility can be expressed in three different ways 
(Iyengar et al., 2012): 1) as a kind of prejudice where partisans believe their political rivals 
possess negative traits (e.g. being close-minded), 2) as partisans’ reluctance to interact with rival 
party members such as holding negative attitudes about their son or daughter marrying an out-
party member (see Bogardus, 1925 for discussion of social distance), and 3) as out-party hostility 
that is seen when partisans harbor negative or cold feelings about their political rivals. 
Given the divisive nature of affective polarization, researchers have expressed growing 
interest in understanding its causes and consequences (e.g. Iyengar, Jackman, & Hahn, 2016; 
Sood, Iyengar, & Dropp, 2012). A concern is that high levels of affective polarization might 
detract from perceived governmental legitimacy or the right to rule (Iyengar et al., 2012). If 
people feel disdain for their political rivals then they might not feel those rivals have the right to 
implement policy. This tendency to view out-party governance as illegitimate may fuel 
polarization even more. In addition to these political concerns are psychological ones, namely, 
how affective polarization might encourage widespread endorsement of partisan stereotypes. For 
 
    
9 
 
example, party members exposed to hostile campaign ads tended to report higher levels of 
affective polarization and endorsed more negative stereotypes about their political rivals (Sood, 
Iyengar, & Dropp, 2012). This finding suggests a close relationship between inter-party hostility 
and partisans’ endorsement of political stereotypes. 
The purpose of the current study is to provide a more thorough and rigorous assessment 
of the factors contributing to partisan stereotypes. In doing so the current study helps to explain 
the divisiveness of contemporary politics, while being one of the first to investigate the affective 
and situational precursors to stereotype exaggeration. Based on prior research in media studies 
and political psychology, I pose four separate hypotheses. First, political stereotypes regarding 
SDO will be exaggerations of the actual psychological differences between liberals and 
conservatives. Second, Democrats will exhibit higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than 
Republicans. Third, like-minded media consumption will be a positive predictor of stereotype 
exaggeration. Fourth, the components of affective polarization (i.e., out-party trait ratings, 




I recruited 301 U.S. participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), each of whom 
had at least a 95% acceptance rate on past MTurk tasks. Researchers have used this acceptance 
criterion to collect at least one sample representative of the U.S. population regarding liberal-
conservative differences in personality (Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015). Also, MTurk 
samples report levels of SDO comparable to in-person samples (Gamblin, Winslow, Lindsay, 
Newsom, & Kehn, 2016). All participants received an informed consent form which can be 
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found in Appendix A. Each participant was paid 75 cents and the study took an average of 10 
minutes to complete. Of the 301 participants, 14% did not identify with either the Democratic or 
Republican Party and were excluded from analyses (see Table 1 for full sample demographics). I 
used this exclusion criterion because only Democrats and Republicans have a clear in-party and 
out-party.  
The final sample consisted of 259 participants. Each participant completed the Social 
Dominance Orientation Scale as a Democrat, a Republican and as themselves. At the end of each 
SDO Scale I asked participants which perspective they had adopted while completing the 
measure. These three items were manipulation checks. Eighty-four percent of participants passed 
all three manipulation checks, 6.2% passed two, 8.1% passed one, and 1.5% passed none. I did 
not exclude participants for failing manipulation checks because results stayed the same 
regardless.  
Sixty-seven percent of participants identified as Democrats and 33% Republican. The 
mean age in the sample was 36.42 years with 50% of participants identifying as female and 50% 
male. Seventy-five percent of the sample identified as White, 11.6% African American, 8.4% 
Asian, .8% American Indian, .4% Native Hawaiian, and 2.8% other. The median level of 
education was a bachelor's degree, and the median income was $40,000-$50,000 a year. Overall, 
the sample was typical of the MTurk participant pool: Largely White, younger, and left-leaning 
(Berinsky et al., 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015). 
Measures  
SDO Scale. The newest version of the SDO Scale (Ho et al., 2015) measures a person’s 
tendency to be domineering and anti-egalitarian. Dominance refers to a person's desire for 
subjugating groups they have deemed subordinate, and anti-egalitarianism concerns a person's 
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preferences for maintaining an unequal distribution of resources. The SDO Scale asks 
participants to rate the degree to which they Strongly Oppose(1) to Strongly Favor(7) a series of 
16 statements. Example items include, “Some groups of people must be kept in their place,” and, 
“Group equality should not be our primary goal.” Higher scores indicate a greater level of SDO. 
Since I asked participants to take the SDO Scale from three perspectives, there are three 
measures of reliability (Average Democrat ∝ = .95; Average Republican ∝ = .94; Self ∝ = .94). 
Like-minded media consumption. Hasell and Weeks (2016) created a four-item 
measure of pro- and counter-attitudinal media usage. The scale asks participants how often they 
consume news from two liberal sources and two conservative sources. An example item 
includes, “How often do you consume news from a major national organization that is frequently 
characterized as favoring liberal positions or Democratic candidates, such as The New York 
Times or MSNBC?” Response options range from 1(Never) to 5(Very Often). A variable for pro-
attitudinal media consumption was calculated by taking participants’ average consumption of 
like-minded sources (∝ = .61). Similarly, the variable for counter-attitudinal media averaged 
participants’ consumption of attitude-inconsistent sources (∝ = .65).  A variable for like-minded 
media consumption was calculated by taking participants’ average consumption of like-minded 
sources and subtracting from it their average consumption of counter-attitudinal sources (Like-
minded media consumption = Average consumption of pro-attitudinal sources – average 
consumption of counter-attitudinal sources). Higher scores represent a greater degree of like-
minded media consumption. 
Affective polarization. I used three measures of affective polarization drawn from 
Iyengar and colleagues (2012). Affective polarization concerns the widening gap between how 
warm partisans feel towards their in-party versus their out-party. The following measures of 
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feeling thermometer, inter-party marriage, and out-party trait ratings assess this affective divide.  
First, participants reported how favorable they felt toward Democrats and Republicans 
using two scales. Response options range from 1(Very unfavorable) to 7(Very favorable). I took 
each participant’s in-party rating and subtracted from it their out-party rating. The higher a 
participant’s feeling thermometer score, the more disapproving they were of their out-party.  
 Second, participants completed a two-item measure of social distance assessing how 
they would feel if their son or daughter married a Democratic/Republican Party supporter. 
Response options range from 1(Very upset) to 5(Very pleased). I took how pleased participants 
would be with an in-party marriage and subtracted from it how pleased they would be with an 
out-party marriage. Higher scores suggest that participants were more inclined towards socially 
distancing themselves from their political rivals. 
Third, participants described the extent to which they agree rival party members possess a 
series of traits. There were five traits with positive valence and five traits with negative valence. I 
used the same traits as Iyengar and colleagues (2012) except for 'intolerant.' I added this 
trait because I view it as a negative attribute that is highly relevant to today's public discourse. 
The negative traits were intolerant, hypocritical, selfish, mean, and close-minded (∝ = .89). The 
positive traits were patriotic, intelligent, honest, open-minded, and generous (∝ = .77). Response 
options ranged from 1(Strongly disagree) to 7(Strongly agree). For each participant I took the 
average of the negative trait ratings and subtracted from it the average of the positive trait 
ratings. Higher scores indicate a stronger belief that one’s political rivals possess negative 
qualities.   
Social media engagement. Participants completed a four-item measure of social media 
engagement (∝ = .83) drawn from Yang, Barnidge, and Rojas (2017). Participants were asked 
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how often they read, share, and express their views about current events on social media. An 
example item is, “How often do you use social media to express your views on current issues?” 
Response options ranged from 1(Never) to 5(Very often). Higher scores indicate greater 
engagement with social media. 
Expectations for public deliberation. To begin to connect partisan stereotypes to 
political behavior, I asked about participants’ expectations for the civic process of public 
meetings. They were asked to imagine themselves at a town hall meeting with approximately 30 
people discussing national policy issues. The instructions are adapted from Hwang, Kim, and 
Huh (2014) (see Appendix C). At this hypothetical meeting, participants were to imagine there 
would be both Democrats and Republicans. Participants answered four questions about their 
expectations for how this meeting would go (∝ = .87). An example item includes, “The 
conversation would resolve conflicts among participants with differing views on the issues.” 
Response options ranged from 1(Strongly disagree) to 7(Strongly agree). The greater a 
participant’s average score, the more positive their expectations were for the discussion. 
Party affiliation. To measure party affiliation I presented participants the following 
question, “In general, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
independent, or something else?” (American National Election Studies, 2008). If participants 
selected Republican or Democrat, they received a follow-up question asking them if they leaned 
Democrat/Republican or if they were strongly Democrat/Republican. If participants selected 
either independent or something else they received an additional question asking if they thought 
of themselves as closer to being a Democrat, Republican, or neither. Participants who leaned 
towards the Democratic or Republican Party were classified as partisans in accordance with 
conventional practice (e.g. Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). If they selected neither then they were 
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classified as independents and I did not include them in the subsequent analyses. 
Design 
 The current study adopted the methodology for assessing stereotype exaggeration used by 
Scherer and colleagues (2015). It is a three level within-subjects design. The independent 
variable was the viewpoint through which participants took the SDO Scale. The dependent 
variable was the degree of stereotype exaggeration participants reported. Stereotype exaggeration 
was computed by taking participants’ mean SDO when they completed the scale as the average 
Republican and subtracting from it their mean SDO when they completed the scale as the 
average Democrat (Stereotype exaggeration = mean SDO as average Republican - mean SDO as 
average Democrat). The resulting variable represents the degree to which participants perceived 
Democrats and Republicans as having different levels of SDO. I call this variable the perceived 
spread score. 
Procedure 
Participants received the informed consent form using the Qualtrics survey site. They 
indicated their agreement to the consent terms by clicking the forward arrow at the bottom of the 
screen. Then they were provided instructions about how they would adopt three different 
viewpoints when taking the SDO Scale as the average Democrat, as the average Republican, and 
as themselves. I asked participants which viewpoint they had adopted after completing each 
scale. These items served as manipulation checks. Appendix B contains the manipulation check 
and viewpoint instructions. Viewpoint order was counterbalanced by randomly assigning 
participants to one of the six possible viewpoint orders. I created a nominal variable representing 
the order with which each participant took the surveys to assess possible order effects. 
Upon completing the scale and manipulation checks from all three viewpoints, 
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participants completed items measuring party affiliation, voting behavior, and political ideology. 
Next, they were then given measures of affective polarization, like-minded media consumption, 
social media engagement, and expectations for public deliberation. The order of these scales was 
randomized to mitigate order effects. Finally, participants answered questions regarding their 
demographic characteristics. These included age, gender, ethnicity, state of residence, political 
ideology, income, and education. Upon completing the demographic questions, participants were 
thanked and provided with a debriefing statement.  
Results 
Testing for Partisan Stereotype Exaggeration 
Using SPSS 25.0, I conducted all confirmatory tests at α = .05. Table 2 contains the 
means and standard deviations for all continuous variables in the current study. There were no 
order effects. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA found no effect of order on stereotype 
exaggeration, F(5, 253) = 0.99, MSE = 4.96, p > .05. In the section that follows I use a question 
and answer format to test hypothesis one: Political stereotypes regarding SDO will be 
exaggerations of the actual psychological differences between liberals and conservatives. 
Do political stereotypes regarding SDO exist?  
Yes. A one-sample t-test indicated that participants perceived the average Republican (M 
= 4.99, SD = 1.36) as being higher in SDO than the average Democrat (M = 2.28, SD = 1.29), 
t(258) = 32.17, p < .001, d = 2.00. Figure 1 depicts overlapping histograms that describe 
partisans’ perception of the average Democrat’s and the average Republican’s level of SDO.  
Do these stereotypes reflect actual liberal-conservative differences in personality?  
Yes. An independent samples t-test revealed that Republicans (M = 3.40, SD = 1.29), 
when rating themselves, reported higher SDO than did Democrats when rating themselves (M = 
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1.96, SD = 1.08), t(257) = -9.45, p < .001, d = 1.25. Figure 2 contains violin plots that depict the 
distribution of actual Democrats’ and Republicans’ SDO. 
Are these stereotypes exaggerations of actual liberal-conservative differences?  
Yes. First, I calculated the actual spread which was equal to Republicans’ mean SDO 
minus Democrats’. Second, I determined the perceived spread which was equal to participants’ 
mean SDO as the average Republican minus their mean SDO as the average Democrat. Third, I 
conducted a one-sample t-test which revealed that the perceived spread was greater than the 
actual spread, t(258) = 9.22, p < .001, d = .57. In other words, participants perceived Democrats 
and Republicans as more different in their level of SDO than they actually were.  
Which party was more so the subject of exaggerated political stereotypes? 
Participants reported stereotype exaggeration. To clarify the source of the exaggeration I 
calculated the extent to which participants overestimated each party’s level of SDO. I calculated 
an exaggeration-about-Democrats score by taking participants’ mean SDO as the average 
Democrat and subtracting from it the mean SDO of actual Democrats in the sample. Similarly, I 
calculated an exaggeration-about-Republicans score by taking participants’ mean SDO as the 
average Republican and subtracting from it the mean SDO of actual Republicans. Overall, the 
exaggeration-about-Republicans score was positive and significantly different from zero, t(258) 
= 18.90, p < .001, d = 1.17, as was the exaggeration-about-Democrats score, t(258) = 3.97, p < 
.001, d = .25. The exaggeration-about-Republicans score was larger than the exaggeration-about-
Democrats score, t(258) = 15.10, p < .001, d = .93. Participants exaggerated Republicans’ level 
of SDO to a greater degree than they did Democrats’.  
In sum, participants evidenced partisan stereotypes in that they perceived the average 
Republican as higher in SDO than the average Democrat. These stereotypes mirrored actual 
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liberal-conservative differences in personality in that Republicans in the sample actually were 
higher in SDO. Furthermore, participants perceived Democrats and Republicans as more 
different in their SDO than they truly were. In other words, they reported stereotype 
exaggeration. Reports of exaggerated stereotypes resulted from participants overestimating 
Republicans’ level of SDO.  
Bivariate Correlations 
 Bivariate correlations were calculated among all of the continuous variables in the current 
study (i.e., social media engagement, expectations for public deliberation, party affiliation, out-
party trait ratings, feeling thermometer, inter-party marriage, like-minded media consumption, 
stereotype exaggeration). I conducted point-biserial correlations for gender with each of the 
continuous variables. Male participants were coded as a 1 and female participants coded as a 2. I 
used Spearman Rank Order Correlations to examine the relationship between the one ordinal 
variable, education, and the continuous variables. Of particular interest were the correlations 
between stereotype exaggeration and the independent variables described in the hypotheses. 
Stereotype exaggeration was statistically significantly correlated with party affiliation (r(257) = -
.38, p < .001), like-minded media consumption (r(257) = .37, p < .001), feeling thermometer 
(r(257) = .21, p < .01), out-party trait ratings (r(257) = .33, p < .001), and inter-party marriage 
(r(257) = .19, p < .01). Table 3 contains all correlations. 
Testing the Precursors to Stereotype Exaggeration 
I used regression analyses to test hypotheses two, three, and four. Hypothesis two is that 
Democrats will exhibit higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than Republicans. Hypotheses 
three and four, respectively, are that like-minded media consumption and affective polarization 
will be positive predictors of stereotype exaggeration. To test these hypotheses I analyzed the 
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data using hierarchical linear regression. The independent variables were gender, education, 
social media engagement, party affiliation, like-minded media consumption, feeling 
thermometer, inter-party marriage, and out-party trait ratings. The dependent variable was 
stereotype exaggeration. Stereotype exaggeration was calculated by taking participants’ mean 
SDO as the average Republican and subtracting from it participants’ mean SDO as the average 
Democrat. I begin by reporting the correlations which are most relevant to the hypotheses. Then 
I confirm that the assumptions of linear regression were met before testing four models. 
Meeting Assumptions of Linear Regression 
 I confirmed that four assumptions of multivariate regression analyses were met. First, to 
evaluate if there were problems with heteroscedasticity, the standardized residuals for this 
regression analysis were plotted against the standardized predicted values (see Figure 3). There 
was no indication of heteroscedasticity in this graph of residuals; however, there appeared to be a 
few outlier cases. Second, I calculated a Mahalanobis distance value for each participant which 
indicated the existence of three outlier cases (df = 8, p < .001, cutoff = 26.13) (see Kannan & 
Manoj, 2015). I included the few outlier cases in my analyses because results did not change 
when these data points were excluded. Third, and consistent with best practices (Cain, Zhang, & 
Yuan, 2017), I tested the assumption of normality. To do this I examined the skewness of the 
standardized residuals (γ1 = -.80). The distribution was negatively skewed reflecting the tendency 
for partisans to perceive Republicans as higher in SDO than Democrats. A reflected log base 10 
transformation of the dependent variable, stereotype exaggeration, did not change the results. 
Fourth, I checked for issues with multicollinearity by examining the correlations among the 
independent variables (see Table 3). No correlations exceeded .7, suggesting a sufficient level of 
statistical independence amongst the predictor variables. In sum, I met the assumptions necessary 
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for conducting multivariate regression analyses, with the exception of a distribution of residuals 
that is negatively skewed. 
Control Variables 
 For each of the regression models I included three control variables. I did this to more 
accurately assess the unique contribution of party affiliation, like-minded media consumption, 
and affective polarization to stereotype exaggeration. First, I used gender as a control variable 
because women tend to associate themselves with the Democratic Party (Pew Research Center, 
2016c), and Democrats tend to express higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than Republicans 
(Scherer et al., 2015). Second, higher education is tied to Democratic Party affiliation so I added 
education as a control variable (Pew Research Center, 2016a). Third, I included social media 
engagement as a control variable because it could potentially affect stereotype exaggeration. For 
instance, when people engage with social media they may expose themselves to more sources 
disagreeing with their views (Messing & Westwood, 2014). This counter-attitudinal exposure 
might provide people with a more accurate view of their political rivals thereby reducing their 
stereotype exaggeration. 
Model One: Control Variables Predicting Stereotype Exaggeration 
The purpose of model one was to establish a baseline for the predictive ability of the 
control variables. Party affiliation, affective polarization, and like-minded media consumption 
should then predict stereotype exaggeration above and beyond the controls. In the first model, 
gender, education, and social media engagement together were statistically significant predictors 
of stereotype exaggeration, F(3, 255) = 10.44, p < .001, MSE = 4.47, R2 = .11. Gender was a 
statistically significant positive predictor of stereotype exaggeration with female participants 
reporting higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than male participants did. Social media 
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engagement was a statistically significant negative predictor of stereotype exaggeration. 
Education was not a statistically significant predictor of stereotype exaggeration, though its beta 
weight was in the predicted direction. Table 6 contains the results of the hierarchical regression 
analyses. 
Model Two: Party Affiliation Predicting Stereotype Exaggeration 
In the second model party affiliation was added because prior research has suggested 
Democratic Party affiliation is associated with higher levels of stereotype exaggeration (e.g. 
Scherer et al., 2015). The combination of the controls and party affiliation were statistically 
significant predictors of stereotype exaggeration, F(4, 254) = 20.38, p < .001, MSE = 3.82, R2 = 
.24. Party affiliation added a statistically significant change in the prediction of stereotype 
exaggeration, ΔF(1, 254) = 44.83, p < .001, ΔR2 = .13 (see Tables 4 and 5). Female participants 
reported statistically significantly higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than male participants 
did. Social media engagement and party affiliation were statistically significant negative 
predictors of stereotype exaggeration. The more strongly participants identified with the 
Democratic Party the greater their level of stereotype exaggeration. Education was not a 
statistically significant predictor of stereotype exaggeration. Model two suggests that party 
affiliation is an important contributor to stereotype exaggeration above and beyond gender, 
social media engagement, and education. 
Model Three: Media Consumption and Inter-Party Hostility Predicting Stereotype 
Exaggeration 
 In model three I entered like-minded media consumption and the components of affective 
polarization (i.e., out-party trait ratings, feeling thermometer, and inter-party marriage). I added 
these variables to test the hypotheses that like-minded media consumption and affective 
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polarization would be positive predictors of stereotype exaggeration. Figure 4 depicts model 
three of the hierarchical multiple regression using standardized coefficients. The combination of 
the control variables, party affiliation, like-minded media consumption, and the components of 
affective polarization were statistically significant predictors of stereotype exaggeration, F(8, 
250) = 14.62, p < .001, MSE = 3.49, R2 = .32. Like-minded media consumption and the 
components of affective polarization added a statistically significant change in the prediction of 
stereotype exaggeration, ΔF(4, 250) = 6.95, p < .001, ΔR2 = .07. Gender, social media 
engagement, and party affiliation remained statistical significant predictors of stereotype 
exaggeration. Out-party trait ratings and like-minded media consumption were both statistically 
significant positive predictors of stereotype exaggeration. Education, feeling thermometer, and 
inter-party marriage were not statistically significant predictors of stereotype exaggeration. The 
takeaway is that like-minded media consumption was a robust predictor of stereotype 
exaggeration because its beta weight was statistically significant even with a set of rigorous 
controls. Only the out-party trait rating component of affective polarization was a statistically 
significant predictor of stereotype exaggeration. 
Model Four: Like-Minded Media Consumption → Stereotype Exaggeration → 
Expectations for Public Deliberation 
I tested an exploratory model to better understand how media consumption impacts 
attitudes towards public deliberation. This model uses stereotype exaggeration as a mediator of 
the relationship between like-minded media consumption and expectations for public 
deliberation. To reduce the probability of a type two error the alpha level was set to .10. I 
conducted these analyses using the Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macros (Model 4). As in the 
confirmatory analyses, gender, social media engagement, and education were kept as control 
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variables. I choose to have indirect effects bootstrapped 5000 times. In this model, the 
independent variable was like-minded media consumption, the mediator was stereotype 
exaggeration, and the dependent variable was expectations for public deliberation. That is, I 
tested whether like-minded media consumption exerts its effect on expectations for public 
deliberation through stereotype exaggeration. Figure 5 depicts the mediation model using 
unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Like-minded media consumption was a statistically significant positive predictor of 
stereotype exaggeration, b = 0.64, SE =.10, p < .001. In addition, like-minded media 
consumption was a statistically significant negative predictor of expectations for public 
deliberation, b = -.13, SE = .07, p < .10. That is, participants who consumed more media 
consistent with their own views tended to have lower expectations for the quality of public 
deliberation between Democrats and Republicans. When I controlled for stereotype 
exaggeration, like-minded media consumption was no longer a statistically significant predictor 
of expectations for public deliberation, b = -.07, SE = .08, p > .35.  These findings suggest that 
stereotype exaggeration fully mediates the relationship between like-minded media consumption 
and expectations for public deliberation. The combination of like-minded media consumption, 
stereotype exaggeration, and the control variables explained 8% of the variance in expectations 
for public deliberation, F(5,253) = 4.68, MSE = 1.97, p < .001, R2 = .08. A Sobel test indicated a 
small negative indirect effect of like-minded media consumption on expectations for public 
deliberation, b = -.06, SE = .03, Z = -2.00, p < .05. In other words, greater like-minded media 
consumption predicted higher levels of stereotype exaggeration which, in turn, predicted lower 
expectations for public deliberation. 
 
 




 The current study reveals the relationship between media consumption, inter-party 
hostility, and partisan stereotypes. In particular, I investigated stereotypes about the average 
Democrat’s and the average Republican’s level of SDO. Social dominance captures a person’s 
general willingness to accept inequality between social groups (Ho et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2015; 
Pratto et al., 1994). Furthermore, this trait is tied to conservativism, disagreeableness, and 
prejudice (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004). Using an instructional manipulation 
and the SDO Scale (Ho et al., 2015), I examined partisan stereotype exaggeration. Partisan 
stereotypes are characterized by people viewing the personalities of Democrats and Republicans 
as more different than they actually are (e.g. Scherer et al., 2015). The current study helps to 
explain why. 
Partisan stereotypes about SDO exaggerated actual liberal-conservative differences in 
this trait. I found three supporting pieces of evidence for the existence of partisan stereotypes. 
First, I demonstrated the existence of political stereotypes by findings that participants perceived 
Republicans as having higher levels of SDO than Democrats. Interestingly, participants 
perceived the average Democrat and Republican as more different in their level of SDO than in 
the 2015 study by Scherer and colleagues. This finding may be the result of a divisive 2016 
presidential election with campaign ads promoting both inter-party hostility and caricature-like 
political stereotypes (see Sood, Iyengar, & Dropp, 2012 for discussion of campaign ads). Second, 
participants reported political stereotypes that reflected actual liberal-conservative differences in 
personality. Not only were Republicans perceived as higher in SDO than Democrats, 
Republicans in the sample actually were higher in this trait. This finding replicates a large body 
of work which uses the motivated social cognition framework to describe how liberals and 
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conservatives differ in their personality (see Jost et al., 2003 for review).  
Third, participants perceived Democrats and Republicans as being more different in SDO 
than partisans in the sample actually were. In other words, participants reported stereotype 
exaggeration and did so in a manner consistent with prior research using the older version of the 
SDO Scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Scherer et al., 2015). The current study adds to the literature by 
demonstrating that participants report stereotype exaggeration when completing the most recent 
version of the SDO Scale (Ho et al., 2015). This contribution provides a new form of pragmatic 
validity for social dominance theory by suggesting that researchers can use its most recent 
measure for investigating partisan stereotypes (Graham et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994).  
Partisan stereotypes tended to exaggerate the average Republican’s level of SDO more 
than the average Democrat’s. That is, participants perceived Republicans as higher in SDO than 
Republicans in the sample actually were. The same was true for Democrats but to a much lesser 
extent. This may have to do with the fact that high SDO is traditionally associated with 
Republicans (Scherer et al., 2015). Partisans may tend to exaggerate the characteristics of 
political groups that they perceive as high rather than low on a given trait. The reason is that high 
levels of a trait will tend to receive more of partisans’ attention making them more likely to be 
the subject of cognitive biases. For instance, partisans might notice Republicans’ high level of 
SDO then proceed to actively look for evidence that Republicans are high in this trait. 
Confirmation bias of this kind may lead partisans to develop exaggerated beliefs about how 
Democrats and Republicans differ in their SDO (see Nickerson, 1998 for review of confirmation 
bias). If I used a trait such as openness to experience that is associated with liberals (Scherer et 
al., 2015), then maybe Democrats’ high level of this trait would be the subject of confirmation 
bias, resulting in Democrats rather than Republicans becoming the subject of exaggerated 
 




If we define prejudice as holding social stereotypes with antipathy and inflexibility 
(Allport, 1954), then participants who reported stereotype exaggeration may be exhibiting 
prejudice. It depends on their attitudes towards SDO. Unlike out-party trait ratings where the 
valence of each item is clear (e.g. ‘close-minded’ is negative), on the SDO Scale some of the 
items have ambiguous valence. For instance, consider this item, “It’s probably a good thing that 
certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.” Whether it is hostile to describe 
a party member as endorsing an item like this will depend on whom you ask. For Republicans, 
given their willingness to accept inequality (e.g. Jost et al., 2003), they may have a more neutral 
or even positive attitude towards SDO. Democrats, in contrast, tend to be in favor of 
egalitarianism and are likely at odds with the explicitly anti-egalitarian sentiment underlying 
SDO. As a result, Democrats’ expression of stereotype exaggeration may constitute prejudice 
because of a hostile sentiment underlying it. Furthermore, if Democrats were to inflexibly 
exaggerate all Republicans’ endorsement of anti-egalitarianism then this would be further 
evidence of prejudice. This conclusion is consistent with the idea that partisans are comfortable 
expressing mild forms of prejudice towards their political rivals (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017).  
I found that Democrats expressed higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than 
Republicans. This finding is consistent with some studies (Graham et al., 2012; Scherer et al., 
2015); however, it contradicts existing research on how liberals and conservatives differ in their 
tendency to stereotype. For instance, one argument is that conservatives tend to rely on 
stereotypes because they promote feelings of certainty (Stern, West, & Rule, 2015). Accordingly, 
research has found that conservatives tend to hold unfavorable attitudes towards counter-
stereotypic people and dislike them because they take away from their feelings of certainty about 
 
    
26 
 
the social world. This bias for certainty helps explain why conservatives tend to rely on physical 
appearance stereotypes when categorizing people as gay or straight (Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 
2013). What do these findings imply for public discourse? Olcaysoy Okten and Saribay (2018) 
found that while anticipating a conversation with someone holding opposing ideological views, 
conservatives tended to activate political stereotypes while liberals did not. Liberals exhibited 
more of the self-regulation necessary to suppress their stereotypes than did conservatives. 
Democrats might be better than Republicans at suppressing political stereotypes, even if they are 
more likely to report endorsing some of them.  
Social identity theorists can explain why Democrats reported higher rates of stereotype 
exaggeration (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Democrats may distinguish themselves from Republicans 
by exaggerating how different the two parties are in terms of SDO. Since Democrats are likely to 
view SDO negatively, the lower they are on this trait relative to Republicans the better. 
Republicans, in contrast, might view SDO as more positive thereby reducing their incentive to 
differentiate themselves from Democrats on this trait. In other words, Republicans have less of a 
reason to report stereotype exaggeration because doing so does not reflect positively on their in-
group like it does for Democrats. The takeaway is that partisans’ attitudes towards traits are 
crucial to consider. These attitudes shape how Democrats and Republicans will use partisan 
stereotypes to distinguish themselves from their political rivals.  
Media Consumption and Affective Polarization as Predictors of Stereotype Exaggeration 
Partisans who consumed more like-minded media in the form of blogs and television 
shows evidenced higher stereotype exaggeration. In contrast, partisans who shared, mobilized, 
and read articles on social media tended to have lower levels of stereotype exaggeration. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, social media platforms can encourage cross-cutting exposure (Messing & 
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Westwood, 2014). This exposure occurs when platforms recommend content to users based on 
social endorsements rather than whether the source has a liberal or conservative bias. Most social 
media platforms have a section listing the most liked or shared posts which can encourage users 
to consume content disagreeing with their views. The same cross-cutting recommendations do 
not occur when individuals use TV as their news source because the platform lacks liking and 
sharing. For this reason, traditional media platforms (e.g. TV) might be more likely to encourage 
like-minded consumption and in doing so magnify stereotype exaggeration and its negative 
consequences for public deliberation.  
Partisans who consumed more like-minded blogs and TV shows reported increased 
stereotype exaggeration which, in turn, predicted lower expectations for public deliberation. One 
might argue that stereotype exaggeration affects partisans’ expectations for public deliberation, 
while having a negligible impact on actual deliberation. Why is that? When partisans engage in 
public deliberation they may rely primarily on information about individuals rather than political 
stereotypes (see Crawford, Jussim, Madon, Cain, & Stevens, 2011 for discussion of political 
person perception model). For instance, imagine a town hall meeting consisting of Democrats 
and Republicans. They may enter the meeting with discouraging partisan stereotypes, but then 
discard them as they learn about the individuals in attendance. Alternatively, those same 
discouraging stereotypes may set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy (see Fleming & Jussim, 
1996 for review). Attendees’ reliance on discouraging stereotypes rather than information about 
individuals may increase the odds that their low expectations come true. This self-fulfilling 
prophecy is a troubling possibility. As partisans’ low expectations are realized their stereotypes 
about Democrats and Republicans may become more entrenched and hostile. 
I found partial support for the idea that inter-party hostility encourages stereotype 
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exaggeration. Attitudes about inter-party marriage and the feeling thermometer did not predict 
stereotype exaggeration. However, out-party trait ratings did. Out-party trait ratings assess inter-
party antipathy by measuring the degree to which partisans describe their political rivals using 
negative traits (e.g. being hypocritical). As such, out-party trait ratings are a measure of 
prejudice. The observed relationship between out-party trait ratings and stereotype exaggeration 
provides additional support for the idea that reports of stereotype exaggeration are indicative of 
prejudice. This interpretation suggests that affective polarization, and its trait rating component 
in particular, can have negative psychological consequences in the form of more prejudice. Put 
simply, one form of prejudice between Democrats and Republicans fuels another.  
The current study’s findings stand in contrast to prior research which has focused on the 
political, rather than psychological, consequences of affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012). 
For instance, one political consequence of affective polarization might be that partisans view the 
government as less legitimate when out-party members are elected. The present results provide 
some support for the idea that affective polarization has negative consequences for politics and 
the psyche. That is, inter-party hostility might promote polarizing stereotypes. These stereotypes 
are a product of human social cognition and its long history of fueling conflict between groups 
(e.g. Neuberg et al., 2010). Indeed, conflict between Democrats and Republicans might be 
reduced if they understood that they are more similar to each other than they think (Graham et 
al., 2012). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The current study faces four main limitations. First, I used a self-report measure of like-
minded media consumption that may lack in construct validity. The fragmentation of the modern 
media environment has made it increasingly difficult to define what constitutes ‘political’ media 
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(Dilliplane, Goldman, & Mutz, 2013). When people do not know what qualifies as political 
media, it becomes more challenging for them to provide accurate estimates of their consumption. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that people typically think about what channels they watch 
not how long they watched it. For instance, a person might remember they watched MSNBC, but 
find it cognitively taxing to recall how long they viewed the channel. Future research would do 
well to measure like-minded media consumption with a behavioral paradigm that is more 
ecologically valid (see Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Messing & Westwood, 2014). Such a paradigm 
might entail developing a web application that discreetly tracks users’ engagement with content. 
Another alternative would be to ask participants if they regularly consume content from an 
inclusive list of media platforms (Dilliplane et al., 2013). 
Second, I used a potentially unreliable measure of like-minded media consumption. This 
measure was a difference score constructed by taking participants’ pro-attitudinal media 
consumption and subtracting from it their counter-attitudinal consumption. As Trafimow (2005) 
notes, the reliability of a difference score is impacted by the reliability of its component 
measures. Both measures of pro and counter-attitudinal media consumption had low reliability 
suggesting that my measure of like-minded media consumption was unreliable. Similarly, I used 
brief measures of inter-party marriage and the feeling thermometer which may have had low 
reliability because they had so few items. This helps to explain why these two scales did not 
predict stereotype exaggeration. Future researchers would do well to develop more reliable self-
report measures of affective polarization and like-minded media consumption for when 
behavioral measures are not viable. Third, I only included Democrats and Republicans in my 
analyses because they have a clear in-party and out-party. This inclusion criterion makes it 
difficult to assess how stereotype exaggeration operates in independent voters who constitute 
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roughly 40 percent of the population (Pew Research Center, 2016b).  
Fourth, the direction of causality is difficult to assess because I used correlational 
analyses. For instance, like-minded media consumption might have caused stereotype 
exaggeration, or vice versa, stereotype exaggeration might have caused like-minded media 
consumption. If partisans view their political rivals as vastly different from themselves (i.e., high 
stereotype exaggeration), then they may be more motivated to avoid counter-attitudinal content 
and consume like-minded media. One can make a similar point about affective polarization. 
Stereotype exaggeration may fuel inter-party hostility rather than the other way around. Future 
studies could experimentally manipulate affective polarization, via a priming paradigm, to 
evaluate its effect on stereotype exaggeration. Alternatively, a longitudinal design, as opposed to 
the current study’s cross-sectional one, would provide more compelling causal support (see 
Turnes & Ernst, 2016 for discussion of longitudinal mediation). For instance, researchers could 
measure affective polarization and like-minded media consumption during a pretest, and then 
assess stereotype exaggeration during the posttest six months later.  
Theoretical Implications 
The current study begins an exploration of the situational factors (e.g. media 
consumption) explaining stereotype exaggeration. Furthermore, it serves as a foundation for 
research examining the person by situation interactions which underlie stereotype exaggeration 
(see Higgins, 1990 for discussion of this theoretical framework). For instance, openness to 
experience, a person factor, may interact with like-minded media consumption, a situational 
factor, to explain stereotype exaggeration. The idea is that partisans with high openness would be 
less prone to like-minded media consumption and its encouragement of political stereotypes. 
These person by situation interactions are vital to study for many reasons including, but not 
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limited to, their impact on public deliberation. Consider that the current polarized political 
climate (e.g. Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018), a situational factor, might interact with partisan 
stereotypes, a person factor, to make pubic deliberation less productive. This example highlights 
how partisan stereotypes, and their consequences, are integrally connected with a dynamic social 
environment.  
Concluding Remarks 
“Deliberation may be defined as civil interaction between citizens for the purpose of 
analyzing a social or political issue. As such, it is reasonable to conceive of this 
communicative practice as the heart and soul of democracy. (Center for Communication 
Research, 2010)” 
 
I found that higher levels of stereotype exaggeration predict lower expectations for public 
deliberation.  This finding implies that the differences partisans perceive there to be between 
Democrats and Republicans matter (Scherer et al., 2015).  Given the importance of partisan 
stereotypes, it is only natural to study their precursors. This study showed that like-minded media 
consumption, and to some extent affective polarization, lead to increased stereotype 
exaggeration. These findings speak to how the modern media environment might be influencing 
partisans’ beliefs about the qualities of Democrats and Republicans in ways that could further 
polarize politics. In addition, these findings expose a hostility underlying partisans’ endorsement 
of political stereotypes about SDO. Most importantly, the current study’s findings reveal 
something insidious about exaggerated partisan stereotypes. Exaggerated stereotypes may be 
hurting a central facet of democracy: Public deliberation. Ultimately, a deeper understanding of 
political stereotypes will be essential for promoting productive conversations amongst 
Democrats and Republicans. 
 




ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior (Rep.). (2008). Retrieved 
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab2a_1.htm 
Arceneaux, K., Johnson, M., & Cryderman, J. (2013). Communication, persuasion and the 
conditioning value of selective exposure: Like minds may unite and divide but they 
mostly tune out. Political Communication, 30, 213-231. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2012.737424 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
Barberá, P., Jost, J. T., Nagler, J., Tucker, J. A., & Bonneau, R. (2015). Tweeting from left to 
right: Is online political communication more than an echo chamber? Psychological 
Science, 26, 1531-1542. doi:10.1177/0956797615594620 
Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating online labor markets for 
 experimental research: Amazon. com's Mechanical Turk. Political Analysis, 20, 351-
 368. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr057 
Bogardus, E. S. (1925). Measuring social distance. Journal of applied sociology, 9, 299-308. 
Cain, M. K., Zhang, Z., & Yuan, K. (2017). Univariate and multivariate skewness and kurtosis 
for measuring nonnormality: Prevalence, influence and estimation. Behavior Research 
Methods, 49, 1716-1735. doi:10.3758/s13428-016-0814-1 
Cappella, J. N., Price, V., & Nir, L. (2002). Argument repertoire as a reliable and valid measure 
  of opinion quality: Electronic dialogue during campaign 2000. Political Communication, 
  19, 73-93. 
Center for Communication Research at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. (2010, August 
 2). Compiled by National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation. 
 
    
33 
 
Chambers, J. R., Baron, R. S., & Inman, M. L. (2006). Misperceptions in intergroup conflict: 
Disagreeing about what we disagree about. Psychological Science, 17, 38-45. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01662.x 
Chambers, J. R., & Melnyk, D. (2006). Why do I hate thee? Conflict misperceptions and 
intergroup mistrust. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1295-1311. 
doi:10.1177/0146167206289979 
Clifford, S., Jewell, R., & Waggoner, P. (2015). Are samples drawn from Mechanical Turk valid 
for research on political ideology? Research & Politics, 2. 
doi:10.1177/2053168015622072  
Crawford, J. T., Jussim, L., Madon, S., Cain, T. R., & Stevens, S. T. (2011). The use of  
  stereotypes and individuating information in political person perception. Personality and 
  Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 529-542. doi:10.1177/0146167211399473 
Dilliplane, S., Goldman, S. K., & Mutz, D. C. (2013). Televised exposure to politics: New 
  measures for a fragmented media environment. American Journal of Political Science,  
 57(1), 236-248. 
Ekehammar, B., Akrami, N., Gylje, M., & Zakrisson, I. (2004). What matters most to prejudice: 
 Big five personality, Social Dominance Orientation, or right-wing authoritarianism?  
 European Journal of Personality, 18, 463-482. 
Festinger, L. (1962). A theory of cognitive dissonance (Vol. 2). Stanford university press. 
Fischer, P., Schulz-Hardt, S., & Frey, D. (2008). Selective exposure and information quantity: 
  How different information quantities moderate decision makers' preference for 
 consistent and inconsistent information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
 94, 231-244. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.94.2.231 
 
    
34 
 
Fleming, C., & Jussim, L. (1996). Self-fulfilling prophecies and the maintenance of social 
  stereotypes: The role of dyadic interactions and social forces. Stereotypes and  
  stereotyping, 161-192. 
Gamblin, B. W., Winslow, M. P., Lindsay, B., Newsom, A. W., & Kehn, A. (2016). Comparing 
in-person, Sona, and Mechanical Turk measurements of three prejudice-relevant 
constructs. Current Psychology: A Journal for Diverse Perspectives on Diverse 
Psychological Issues, 36, 217-224. doi:10.1007/s12144-015-9403-1 
Garrett, R. K., Gvirsman, S. D., Johnson, B. K., Tsfati, Y., Neo, R. & Dal, A. (2014). 
Implications of pro- and counterattitudinal information exposure for affective 
polarization. Human Communication Research, 40, 309–332. doi:10.1111/hcre.12028 
Garrett, R. K., & Stroud, N. J. (2014). Partisan paths to exposure diversity: Differences in pro- 
and counterattitudinal news consumption. Journal of Communication, 64, 680–701. 
doi:10.1111/jcom.12105 
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., & Haidt, J. (2012). The moral stereotypes of liberals and 
conservatives: Exaggeration of differences across the political divide. SSRN Electronic 
Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2027266 
Greene, S. (1999). Understanding party identification: A social identity approach. Political 
Psychology, 20, 393-403. doi:10.1111/0162-895x.00150 
Hasell, A., & Weeks, B. E. (2016). Partisan provocation: The role of partisan news use 
and emotional responses in political information sharing in social media. Human 
Communication Research, 42, 641-661. doi:10.1111/hcre.12092 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A 
  regression-based approach. Guilford Publications. 
 
    
35 
 
Higgins, E. T. (1990). Personality, social psychology, and person-situation relations: Standards 
  and knowledge activation as a common language. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of 
  personality: Theory and research (pp. 301-338). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Kteily, N., Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Pratto, F., Henkel, K. E., . . . Stewart, 
A. L. (2015). The nature of Social Dominance Orientation: Theorizing and measuring 
preferences for intergroup inequality using the new SDO7 scale. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 109, 1003-1028. doi:10.1037/pspi0000033 
Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Levin, S., Thomsen, L., Kteily, N., & Sheehy-Skeffington, J. 
(2012). Social Dominance Orientation: Revisiting the structure and function of a variable 
predicting social and political attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 
583-606. doi:10.1177/0146167211432765 
Huff, C., & Tingley, D. (2015). “Who are these people?” Evaluating the demographic  
  characteristics and political preferences of MTurk survey respondents. Research & 
  Politics, 2, 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168015604648 
Hwang, H., Kim, Y., & Huh, C. U. (2014). Seeing is believing: Effects of uncivil online debate   
   on political polarization and expectations of deliberation. Journal of Broadcasting & 
   Electronic Media, 58, 621-633. doi:10.1080/08838151.2014.966365 
Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in 
media use. Journal of Communication, 59, 19–39. doi:10.1111/j.14602466.2008.01402.x 
Iyengar, S., Jackman, S., & Hahn, K. (2016). Polarization in less than 30 seconds. Political 
Communication in Real Time: Theoretical and Applied Research Approaches 
Iyengar, S., & Krupenkin, M. (2018). The Strengthening of Partisan Affect. Political  
  Psychology, 39, 201-218. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12487 
 
    
36 
 
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity 
perspective on polarization, Public Opinion Quarterly, 76, 405-431. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038  
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, 
and elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 307-337. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as 
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-375. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.129.3.339 
Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1993). Definition and assessment of accuracy in social stereotypes. 
Psychological Review, 100, 109–128. 
Jussim, L., Crawford, J., Anglin, S., Chambers, J., Stevens, S., & Cohen, F. (2016). Stereotype 
  accuracy: One of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology. 
  Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, 31-63. 
Jussim, L., Crawford, J. T., & Rubinstein, R. S. (2015). Stereotype (in)accuracy in 
perceptions of groups and individuals. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24, 
490-497. doi:10.1177/0963721415605257 
Kannan, K. S., & Manoj, K. (2015). Outlier detection in multivariate data. Applied Mathematical 
Sciences, 9, 2317–2324. http://dx.doi.org/10.12988/ams.2015.53213. 
Katz, D., & Braly, K. W. (1935). Racial prejudice and racial stereotypes. Journal of Abnormal 
 Social Psychology, 30, 175–193. 
Lelkes, Y. (2016). Mass polarization: Manifestations and measurements. Public Opinion  
 Quarterly, 80, 392-410. doi:10.1093/poq/nfw005 
 
    
37 
 
Lelkes, Y., & Westwood, S. J. (2017). The limits of partisan prejudice. The Journal of Politics, 
79, 485-501. doi:10.1086/688223 
Levendusky, M. S. (2013). Why do partisan media polarize viewers? American Journal of 
Political Science, 57, 611–623. doi:10.1111/ajps.12008 
McCauley, C. (1995). Are stereotypes exaggerated? A sampling of racial gender academic 
occupational and political stereotypes. In Y., Lee, L. J., Jussim, C., McCauley, editors. 
Stereotype accuracy: Toward appreciating group differences. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. pp. 215–243. 
McCauley, C., & Stitt, C. L. (1978). An individual and quantitative measure of stereotypes. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 929-940. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.36.9.929 
Messing, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2014). Selective exposure in the age of social media:  
  Endorsements trump partisan source affiliation when selecting news online.  
  Communication Research, 41, 1042-1063. doi:10.1177/0093650212466406 
Murphy, S. (1998). The impact of factual versus fictional media portrayals on cultural 
stereotypes. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 560, 
165-178. doi:10.1177/0002716298560001013 
Mutz, D. C. (2006). Hearing the other side: Deliberative versus participatory democracy.  
 Cambridge University Press. 
Neuberg, S. L., Kenrick, D. T., & Schaller, M. (2010). Evolutionary social 
psychology. Handbook of social psychology. 
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review  
 of general psychology, 2, 175. 
 
    
38 
 
Olcaysoy Okten, I., & Saribay, S. A. (2018). Stereotype activation and self-regulation by  
  conservatives and liberals in political encounters. The Journal of Social Psychology, 
  (in press). 
Pew Research Center. (2014). Political Polarization and Media Habits. Retrieved May 21, 2018, 
from http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/ 
Pew Research Center. (2014). Political Polarization and the American Public. Retrieved May 21, 
2018, from http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-
american-public/ 
Pew Research Center. (2016). Educational Divide in Vote Preferences on Track to be Wider than 
  in Recent Elections. Retrieved May 21, 2018, from  http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
 tank/2016/09/15/educational-divide-in-vote- preferences-on-track-to-be-wider-than-in-
 recent-elections/ 
 Pew Research Center. (2016). 5 Facts About America's Political Independents. Retrieved May 
 21, 2018, from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/05/5-facts-about-
 americas-political-independents/ 
Pew Research Center. (2016). The Parties on the Eve of the 2016 Election: Two Coalitions, 
 Moving Further Apart. Retrieved May 21, 2018, from http://www.people 
 press.org/2016/09/13/the-parties-on-the-eve-of-the-2016-election-two-coalitions-moving-
 further-apart/ 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social Dominance Orientation: 
A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 67, 741–763. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741 
Scherer, A. M., Windschitl, P. D., & Graham, J. (2015). An ideological house of mirrors. Social 
 
    
39 
 
Psychological and Personality Science, 6, 201-209. doi:10.1177/1948550614549385 
Sood, G., Iyengar, S., & Dropp, K. (2012). Coming to Dislike Your Opponents: The Polarizing 
 Impact of Political Campaigns. Presented at the American Political Science Association, 
  New Orleans, LA. 
Stern, C., West, T. V., Jost, J. T., & Rule, N. O. (2013). The politics of gaydar: Ideological  
 differences in the use of gendered cues in categorizing sexual orientation. Journal of  
 Personality and Social Psychology, 104, 520-541. doi:10.1037/a0031187 
Stern, C., West, T. V., & Rule, N. O. (2015). Conservatives negatively evaluate   
  counterstereotypical people to maintain a sense of certainty. PNAS Proceedings of the  
  National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112, 15337-15342. 
  doi:10.1073/pnas.1517662112 
Stroud, N. J. (2010). Polarization and partisan selective exposure. Journal of Communication, 
60, 556–576. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. 
Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). 
Salt Lake City, UT: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 
Trafimow, D. (2015). A defense against the alleged unreliability of difference scores. Cogent 
  Mathematics, 2, 1064626. 
Turnes, P. B., & Ernst, R. (2016). The Use of Longitudinal Mediation Models for Testing Causal 
  Effects and Measuring Direct and Indirect Effects. China-USA Business Review, 1. doi: 
  10.17265/1537-1514/2016.01.001 
Wojcieszak, M., Bimber, B., Feldman, L., & Stroud, N. (2015). Partisan news and 
 
    
40 
 
political participation: Exploring mediated relationships. Political Communication, 33, 
241-260. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2015.1051608 
Yang, J., Barnidge, M., & Rojas, H. (2017). The politics of 'Unfriending': User filtration in 
  response to political disagreement on social media. Computers in Human Behavior, 70, 
  22-29. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2016.12.079 
Ziemke, D. A. (1980). Selective exposure in a presidential campaign contingent on certainty and 







































 Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Education, Income, and Party Affiliation for Full Sample (N = 301) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 Variable                                             N                %                         
_____________________________________________________________________________        
1. Age        
20 to 30                                   121                 40.2 
30 to 40                                   94                   31.2 
40 to 50                                   44                   14.6 
50 to 60                                   31                   10.3 
60 +                                         11                    2.3 
2. Gender     
Male                                        153                 50.8 
Female                                    148                 49.2 
3. Ethnicity           
White                                      218                 72.4 
Black or African American    30                   10 
Asian                                      26                   8.6 
Other                                       11                   3.7 
American Indian                     2                     0.7 
Native Hawaiian                     1                     0.3                         
4. Education      
High school graduate or less  22                   7.3 
Some college to associates           106                 35.2 
Bachelors to masters                    166                 55.2 
Doctoral to professional               7                     2.3 
5. Income  
29,999 or less                                 76                   25.3 
30,000 to 59,999                            113                 37.5             
60,000 to 89,999                            57                   18.9            
90,000 to 150,000 +                       55                   18.3 
6. Party Affiliation  
Democrat              174                  57.8 
Republican                                    85                    28.2 












Means and Standard Deviations for Each of the Continuous Regression Variables (N = 259) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 Variable                                             M                   SD                  Scale Endpoints              
_____________________________________________________________________________        
Affective polarization 
1. Out-party trait ratings        1.97              2.40                       -6 to 6                     
2. Feeling thermometer              3.12              2.02                       -6 to 6                            
3. Inter-party marriage                   1.16             1.44                       -4 to 4                           
4. Party affiliation                            -0.83             2.16                       -3 to 3                             
5. Like-minded media                          0.99             1.19                       -4 to 4  
6. Social media engagement             2.52              0.93                        1 to 5  
7. Public deliberation                          4.23              1.45                        1 to 7                              
8. Stereotype exaggeration                  2.72             2.23                       -6 to 6                              
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Like-minded = Like-minded media consumption; Public deliberation = Expectations for 











Bivariate Correlations for each Variable in the Regression Analysis (N = 259) 
_____________________________________________________________________________                                            
                           
Variable                          1         2         3          4           5          6          7           8          9        10  
_____________________________________________________________________________  
1. Gender                        -                            
2. Education            -.07     - 
3. Party Affiliation          -.12   -.01     -                               
4. Like-minded media       .10    .14*   -.39***  - 
5. Social media                 -.11    .09     -.05      -.04        - 
6. Feeling Thermometer     .06    .06  -.30***   .55***   .09        - 
7. Inter-Party Marriage       -.07   .10    .17**   .39***  .10       .51***    - 
8. Out-Party Trait Rating    .09    .00   -.27*** .41***  .01       .54***.51***    - 
9. Stereotype exaggeration  .19**.04   -.38***.37*** -.23*** .21**  .00        .33***    - 
10. Public deliberation        .07   -.02    -.04    -.11       .23***  .01     -.16**   -.21**    -.20**   -                                         
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01;***p < .001; two-tailed. Like-minded media = Like-minded media 










A Model Summary for Controls, Party Affiliation, Like-Minded Media Consumption, and 
Affective Polarization as Predictors of Stereotype Exaggeration at Each Step (N = 259) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Model                       R          R2        SEE         ΔR2           ΔF              df 1           df 2            p 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Controls              
                              .33        .11        2.11           .11           10.44            3             255       < .001            
         
2. Party affiliation             
                              .49       .24        1.95            .13           44.83             1           254        < .001           
 
3. Media and affect             
                              .56       .32        1.87            .08            6.95               4           250       < .001 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: SEE = Standard Error of the Estimate; Controls = gender, education, and social media 











ANOVA Summary Tables for Controls, Party Affiliation, Like-Minded Media Consumption, and 
Affective Polarization as Predictors of Stereotype Exaggeration at Each Step (N = 259) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Model  Source                SS                    df                  MS                 F                p 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 1         Regression              140.05              3              46.68          10.44       < .001 
Residual                 1140.33              255               4.47  
Total                       1280.38             258 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 2         Regression              311.13              4           77.78         20.38       < .001 
Residual                969.25              254              3.816  
Total                       1280.38            258 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  3        Regression            408.10               8          51.01       14.62       < .001 
Residual                872.28              250              3.49 
Total                     1280.38             258 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Controls = gender, education, and social media engagement; Affective polarization = out-








Results of the Hierarchical Linear Regression Analyses with Controls, Party Affiliation, Like-
Minded Media Consumption, and Affective Polarization as the Independent Variables at Each 
Step Predicting Stereotype Exaggeration (N = 259) 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
95%   CI                                                                                                                                                                                                  
____________  
Model        Variables          B        SE B         β          t           p          sr2        lower        upper 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
   1            (Constant)       2.14      0.70               
                  Gender           1.01      0.27        .23    3.81   < .001        .23     0.49          1.54              
       Education       0.15      0.10       .09    1.43       .16         .08        -0.06          0.35    
                  Social Media -0.63      0.14     -.26   -4.43   < .001      -.26        -0.92         -0.35    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   2            (Constant)       2.21      0.65               
                  Gender           0.80      0.25       .18    3.24      < .01       .18     0.31         1.29              
       Education       0.15     0.09       .09     1.61       .108       .09        -0.03          0.34    
                  Social Media -0.67     0.13     -.28     -5.07   < .001      -.26       -0.93         -0.41    
      Party Aff.      -0.38     0.06      -.37    -6.70   < .001      -.37       -0.49         -0.27    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    3            (Constant)       1.89     0.63               
                  Gender            0.72     0.24       .16    2.99   < .01        .16     0.24         1.19              
       Education        0.14     0.09       .08    1.53      .13        .08         -0.04          0.32    
                  Social Media  -0.62     0.13     -.26   -4.86   < .001     -.25        -0.88         -0.37    
      Party Aff.       -0.27     0.06     -.26   -4.49   < .001     -.25        -0.39         -0.15   
      Like-Minded  -0.37     0.13       .20    2.92   < .01        .15         0.12          0.61 
      Feeling Ther.  -0.09     0.08     -.08  -1.16      .25       -.06        -0.25          0.06 
                  Out-Party         0.19     0.06      .20    3.09   <.01         .16         0.07          0.31 
       Inter-Party       0.03     0.10       .02   0.33      .74         .02        -0.17         0.24 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Inter-Party = Inter-Party Marriage; Out-Party = Out-Party Trait Ratings; Like-Minded = 
Like-Minded Media Consumption; Social Media = Social Media Engagement; Party Aff. = Party 
Affiliation; Feeling Ther. = Feeling Thermometer; Controls = gender, education, and social 
media engagement; Affective polarization = out-party trait ratings, feeling thermometer, and 
inter-party marriage  
 
 





Figure 1. Overlapping histograms, featuring kernel density estimation, describing partisan 
stereotypes about the average Democrat’s and the average Republican’s level of SDO. This 
figure illustrates that partisans perceived that average Republican as higher in SDO than the 
















Figure 2. Violin plot depicting how actual Democrats and Republicans in the sample differed in 
their SDO. This figure demonstrates that actual Republicans in the sample had higher SDO than 

































Figure 4. Results of hierarchical multiple regression using standardized coefficients; Social 
media engagement, education, and gender included as control variables, F(4, 254) = 20.38, p < 
.001, MSE = 3.82, R2 = .24.
 *
























Figure 5. Unstandardized regression coefficients for stereotype exaggeration mediating the 
relationship between like-minded media consumption and expectations for public deliberation. 
















total effect: c = -.13+ 








The Psychology of Political Ideology 
  
Welcome to “The Psychology of Political Ideology,” an experiment investigating the intricacies 
of political ideology being conducted by students at Western Washington University. This online 
survey will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Informing you about the study and formally 
seeking your consent is standard practice in our studies. 
            
                                                               Consent Form 
  
This study is about how political information is processed. It is being conducted by Kamran 
Hughes. Please ask the researcher to explain anything you do not understand in regards to the 
procedures. 
 
There are no potential risks associated with participation in this study. You can decide not to join 
the study. If you join the study, you can change your mind and quit at any time.  There will be no 
penalty or loss of services or benefits if you decide to not take part in the study or quit later. You 
also have the right to choose not to respond to any item on the survey. 
  
This is an online survey that will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. You cannot take part 
in this study if you are under the age of 18. If you take part in this study you will be asked to rate 
statements about how you deal with certain situations or feelings. After completing the survey 
you will read a debriefing that outlines the study in more detail. 
By participating in this study you are expanding the knowledge base of the field of psychology. 
You may also gain a greater understanding of the measurement of psychological constructs and 
the formation of your own attitudes.  
  
After the completion of the study you may contact the researcher for information about the full 
range of the study and the results by sending an email to hughesk6@wwu.edu. You may choose 
not to participate in this study at any time.  
The data for this study are being collected confidentially. Neither the researcher(s) nor anyone 
else will be able to link your responses to you. The results may be published or presented at 
professional meetings, but the identities of all research participants will not be disclosed. In 
compliance with professional guidelines, the data will be kept for 3 years on a password 
protected computer and flash drive. 
  
Questions about your rights as a research subject should be directed to: Research and Sponsored 
Programs Office at (360) 650-2146 or compliance@wwu.edu. In the event you suffer any 
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adverse effects as a result of your participation, you should contact the primary researcher at 
hughesk6@wwu.edu or the Research and Sponsored Programs Office listed above. 
  
By clicking the arrow and continuing: 
● You understand the information given to you in this form 
● You have been told how you can ask questions and state any concerns 
● You acknowledge that the researcher has responded to any questions you've submitted 
● You believe you understand the research study and the potential benefits and risks that are 
involved. 
  






















Instructions for Experimental Manipulation 
 
On the following pages, you will be answering the same set of questions from three different 
perspectives: average Democrat, average Republican, and your own personal perspective. On the 
top of each page we state the perspective you are to adopt for that page in bold and italics. We 
will ask you about the perspective at the end of the page. 
  
Thank you for paying close attention to these instructions.  
 
 
SDO Scale Instructions (Ho et al., 2015) (Prompt wording influenced by Graham et al., 2012) 
 
Indicate how much you think the average Republican (Democrat) would favor or oppose each 
idea below. Use the following rating scale: Strongly Oppose – Strongly Favor. You can work 
quickly; your first feeling is generally best. Remember, instead of selecting your own answers; 
answer all the questions as the average Democrat (Republican).  
 
Viewpoint manipulation check 
I just took this page of the survey as….. 

























Expectations for Public Deliberation (adapted from Hwang et al., 2014) 
Instructions: Imagine yourself taking part in a town hall meeting that consists of both Democrats 
and Republicans. There are approximately 30 people at the meeting and they are discussing 
national policy issues. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about how the discussion will go. 
 
The conversation would resolve conflicts among participants with differing views on the issues. 
The conversation would be useful for participants to gain a better understanding of the issues. 
The conversation would help participants see the issues from multiple perspectives. 
 
The conversation would lead participants to be more open to the opposing views. 
 
(Response options range from 1(Strongly disagree) to 7(Strongly agree)) 
 
